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Abstract
We present an infinite-game characterization of the well-founded semantics for function-free logic programs with negation.
Our game is a simple generalization of the standard game for negation-less logic programs introduced by van Emden [M.H. van
Emden, Quantitative deduction and its fixpoint theory, Journal of Logic Programming 3 (1) (1986) 37–53] in which two players,
the Believer and the Doubter, compete by trying to prove (respectively disprove) a query. The standard game is equivalent to the
minimum Herbrand model semantics of logic programming in the sense that a query succeeds in the minimum model semantics iff
the Believer has a winning strategy for the game which begins with the Doubter doubting this query. The game for programs with
negation that we propose follows the same rules as the standard one, except that the players swap roles every time the play “passes
through” negation. We start our investigation by establishing the determinacy of the new game by using some classical tools from
the theory of infinite-games. Our determinacy result immediately provides a novel and purely game-theoretic characterization of
the semantics of negation in logic programming. We proceed to establish the connections of the game semantics to the existing
semantic approaches for logic programming with negation. For this purpose, we first define a refined version of the game that uses
degrees of winning and losing for the two players. We then demonstrate that this refined game corresponds exactly to the infinite-
valued minimum model semantics of negation [P. Rondogiannis,W.W. Wadge, Minimum model semantics for logic programs
with negation-as-failure, ACM Transactions on Computational Logic 6 (2) (2005) 441–467]. This immediately implies that the
unrefined game is equivalent to the well-founded semantics (since the infinite-valued semantics is a refinement of the well-founded
semantics).
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we give an infinite-game semantics for function-free logic programs with negation. The game we
propose is very simple to describe and is radically different from the technical tools that are currently used for the
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investigation of the semantics of negation. In particular, the game leads to a novel proof of the fact that every logic
program with negation has a “distinguished” model (i.e., a model that reflects the intuitive reading of a program and
which for this reason has a special status among the minimal models of the program). This fact is a consequence of
the determinacy of the game, which can be established using purely game-theoretic arguments and in particular some
of the most important results in the theory of infinite-games.
We prove that our game characterization coincides with the well-founded semantics [17], which is the most
widely acceptable semantics for negation when one seeks a unique model of the program. In order to establish this
equivalence, we use a refined version of the game which allows different degrees of winning and losing for the two
players. We demonstrate that this refined game is equivalent to the infinite-valued minimum model semantics for logic
programming with negation that was recently introduced by two of the authors [13,14]. The fact that the infinite-valued
semantics is itself a refinement of the well-founded one, leads immediately to the conclusion that the unrefined game
coincides with the well-founded semantics.
In order to make the paper entirely self-contained we have included all the necessary background for both negation
in logic programming and infinite-games (hoping also in this way to make the paper accessible to people from both
areas). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces in an intuitive way the game for logic
programs with negation. Section 3 presents the well-founded semantics of logic programming with negation; our
presentation is based on our recent infinite-valued characterization of the well-founded model. Section 4 introduces the
basic concepts and results regarding infinite-games of perfect information. Section 5 defines in a formal way the game
for programs with negation. In Section 6 we demonstrate that the game is actually determined. Section 7 presents a
refined game that uses an infinite number of potential payoffs; this new game is also shown to be determined. Section 8
finally establishes the equivalence of our game semantics to the well-founded semantics of logic programming. The
paper concludes with a discussion of related work and of possible future extensions of the game.
2. Game semantics for logic programming
The starting point of our investigation is a simple game semantics for ordinary negation-less logic programming
which has been known for many years [16]. Suppose we have a program P and a goal clause G; for simplicity, assume
that the atoms that appear in P or G are all ground. We describe how the question, “does G succeed as a query to P”
can be reduced to the question, “does Player I have a winning strategy in the game ΓPG ”.
The game ΓPG is a two-person infinite-game of perfect information. Player I, who we will also call the Believer,
believes that G will succeed and his first move is to play G, thus asserting his belief. Player II, who we will also call
the Doubter, thinks G will fail. His first move is to choose one of the atoms in G which he thinks will fail on its own,
and plays it, thus asserting his doubts. From then on play proceeds as follows: the Believer (who thinks the atom just
played by the Doubter will in fact succeed) must play a clause in the program whose head is the atom just played; and
the Doubter must, on his turn, play one of the atoms in the body of this clause.
Either player can win by making a move for which his opponent has no legal response. For the Believer, this means
playing a clause with an empty body; this happens when the Doubter chose to doubt an atom for which there is a fact
in the program. For the Doubter, this means choosing an atom for which there is no rule; in this case the Believer has
chosen a rule with an atom in its body for which there is no evidence. Finally, we must give the Doubter an important
advantage: he wins if the play goes on forever with both players always giving legal responses (for example, consider a
play of the game that has goal← p and whose program consists of the single rule p← p). The Doubter is considered
a winner in this case since he indefinitely avoids being cornered by the Believer.
It is not hard to argue informally about the correctness of the game semantics for negation-less programs. If G
actually fails, the Doubter’s winning strategy is to repeatedly choose atoms which themselves fail. If G succeeds, the
Believer’s winning strategy is to repeatedly choose rules that are applicable, i.e., for which all the atoms in the body
succeed. The only subtle point is that the Believer, in choosing applicable rules, must avoid ones (like q ← q) which
do not actually advance the game.
Once the standard game is understood in terms of the informal anthropomorphic description given above, it is not
hard to see how to extend it to programs with negation. There is one new rule: when one of the players plays a literal
of the form ∼ p, his opponent must, on the next move, play p. And this move must then be answered by playing a
clause whose head is p, and so on.
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The significance of the new rule is that when a negation is encountered, the players swap roles — the Believer
becomes the Doubter and vice versa. For example, suppose that Player II, who doubts q, has just played it. Player I,
who believes q , plays the clause q ← r,∼ p. Then Player II, who doubted q, thinks the weak link is∼ p, and plays it.
Player I, who believes q , must believe ∼ p, which means doubting p, and playing it. Thus I, who was a believer and
believed in q , has now become a doubter, who doubts p. His opponent, who was a doubter, is now a believer (in p)
and must find a rule for p to play.
The rules for winning or losing require modification. As before, any player who has no legal move loses
immediately. Thus either I or II can lose if they find themselves, in the doubter’s role, doubting a fact or, in the
believer’s role, believing without evidence. Furthermore, if the game play is infinite and after a certain point one of
the players remains a doubter, he wins (this situation is similar to the corresponding one for negation-less programs).
Finally, if during a play the two players swap roles infinitely often, the result is a tie; intuitively, none of the players
has managed to get an advantage during this play, since they both engaged in circularities through negation.
As we will demonstrate in the coming sections, the game we have just described is equivalent to the well-founded
semantics of negation. The well-founded semantics is based on a three-valued logic, namely a logic that uses the
truth values False, 0 and True. Intuitively, we need to demonstrate that an atom has value True (respectively False)
in the well-founded model iff Player I (respectively Player II) has a winning strategy in the corresponding game.
Additionally, we have to show that the value 0 corresponds to the case where the best choice for both players is to
lead the game to a tie. Establishing the equivalence that we just described is not straightforward. The reason is that
(as we are going to see) the well-founded model is constructed in stages, and the truth values that are introduced in
different stages can be thought of as having different “strengths”. On the other hand, the game we have described does
not have any notion of different levels of winning or losing. Therefore, in order to establish the equivalence it would
be convenient if we had on the one hand a refinement of the well-founded model in which the strengths of truth values
are as explicit as possible and on the other hand a refinement of the game that uses different degrees of winning and
losing.
We have recently introduced a characterization of the well-founded model that captures in a logical way this notion
of different strengths of truth values [13,14]. More specifically, the infinite-valued semantics introduced in [13,14] is
a refinement of the well-founded semantics and it uses instead an infinite number of truth values ordered as follows:
F0 < F1 < F2 < · · · < 0 < · · · < T2 < T1 < T0.
Inspired by this semantics, we define a refined game which supports different degrees of winning and losing. We then
demonstrate that this new game is equivalent to the infinite-valued semantics. As it is demonstrated in [13,14], if we
collapse the Fi and the Ti values of the minimum infinite-valued model to classical False and True respectively, we get
the well-founded model. This immediately implies that the initial (unrefined) game is equivalent to the well-founded
semantics.
3. The well-founded semantics of logic programs
The problem of extending logic programming with negation, is probably the most broadly studied topic in the
area of logic programming. The generally accepted computational interpretation of negated atoms is negation-as-
failure. Intuitively, a goal∼ A succeeds iff the subcomputation which attempts to establish A terminates and fails. For
example, given the program
p←
r ←∼ p
s ←∼q
the query ← r fails because p succeeds, while the query ← s succeeds because q fails. There have been many
proposals for assigning a formal semantics to the above intuitive operational notion (for example the Refs. [1,3,11,5]
provide nice surveys for this area). After many years of research, it appears that the most widely acceptable approaches
to the semantics of negation-as-failure are the well-founded semantics [17] and the stable model semantics [6]. The
former approach provides a unique “distinguished” model of the program while the latter allows for the possibility of
zero, one or many models. In this paper we will focus on the well-founded semantics.
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The basic idea in the construction of the well-founded model is to rank the atoms of a program according to the
maximum “depth” of negation used in their defining clauses (this idea is actually a generalization of the notion of
stratification). The atoms of rank 0 (like p and q above) are defined (possibly in terms of each other) without the use
of negation. The atoms of rank 1 (like r and s) are defined in terms of each other and those of rank 0, with negation
applied only to atoms of rank 0. Those of rank 2 are defined with negations applied only to atoms of rank 1 or 0; and
so on. The model can then be constructed in stages. The clauses for the rank 0 atoms form a standard logic program,
and its minimum model is used to assign values for the rank 0 atoms. These are then treated as constants, so that the
clauses for the rank 1 atoms no longer have negations. The minimum model is used to assign values to the rank 1
atoms, which are in turn converted to constants; and so on. There exist however programs in which some atoms are
defined (directly or indirectly) in terms of their own negations. In the case of such circularities it is possible that some
of the atoms cannot be ranked. For such atoms we need an extra intermediate neutral truth value denoted by 0. For
example, the program that consists of the unique clause p ←∼ p has as its well-founded model the interpretation
{(p, 0)}.
We now proceed to formalize the above notions. We start by defining the syntax of the logic programming language
that we consider.
A general logic program (or simply a logic program) is a finite set of rules of the form:
p← q0, . . . , qn−1,∼r0, . . . ,∼rm−1
where the qi ’s, the ri ’s and p are propositional atoms.
A remark is in order. It is a common practice in the area of negation in logic programming to study propositional
programs instead of first-order ones. This is because every first-order logic program can be instantiated into a (possibly
infinite) propositional program [5]. It is also a common practice in many cases to deal with finite propositional
programs in order to avoid unnecessary complications in the proofs. The results that are obtained for finite programs
can usually be lifted to the infinite case with some notational overhead. For these reasons we assume that the programs
that we are considering are propositional and finite. In the concluding section we outline how our results could be
extended to the infinite case. Nevertheless, it should be noted that our results apply directly to Datalog [15], the
function-free subset of logic programming that has significant applications in the area of deductive databases.
Rules of the above form are called clauses. The symbol p is called the head of the clause, the qi ’s are called positive
literals and the ∼ ri ’s negative literals. In the above clause, the part on the right of the← constitutes the body of the
clause. A clause with empty body is usually termed a unit clause or fact. Finally, a goal clause is a formula of the
form← p. Given a logic program P and a goal G, we write PG for P ∪ {G}. We write literals(PG) for the set of all
literals that appear in the bodies of clauses of P and in the goal clause G; similarly, we write negvars(P) for the set of
all propositional atoms, that appear in negative literals in the bodies of clauses of P .
As we have already mentioned, the well-founded semantics is a three-valued approach: certain atoms in the well-
founded model will be assigned the value True, others the value False, and the remaining the value 0. In other words,
the well-founded semantics is based on a three-valued logic whose truth values are ordered as: False < 0 < True (see
for example [12]).
In the following we will give a description of the well-founded model based on a recent characterization that we
have derived [14] (and which will prove very convenient for our purposes). The basic idea behind this characterization
is that in order to obtain a purely model-theoretic description of the well-founded semantics, it is necessary to consider
a much more refined multiple-valued logic which is based on an infinite set of truth values, ordered as follows:
F0 < F1 < F2 < · · · < 0 < · · · < T2 < T1 < T0.
Intuitively, F0 and T0 correspond to the classical False and True values respectively. The values below 0 are ordered
like the natural numbers. The values above 0 have exactly the reverse order. The intuition behind the new values is
that they express different levels of truthfulness and falsity that correspond to the different levels in the construction
of the well-founded model. In the following we denote by V the set consisting of the above truth values. It should
be noted that if we were dealing with infinite propositional programs then we would need to extend the truth domain
to contain a Tα and a Fα for every countable ordinal α (see [14] for details). A notion that will prove useful in what
follows is that of the order of a given truth value:
Definition 1. The order of a truth value is defined as follows: order(Tn) = n, order(Fn) = n and order(0) = +∞.
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Notice that in the above definition the order of 0 is taken to be+∞ simply because 0 is approximated from below and
from above by values of all possible finite orders.
The Herbrand Base BP of a logic program P consists of the set of all propositional symbols that appear in the
program. The notion of “interpretation of a program” can now be defined:
Definition 2. An (infinite-valued) interpretation I of a program P is a function from BP to V .
As a special case of interpretation, we will use ∅ to denote the interpretation that assigns the F0 value to all
propositional atoms of a program. In order to define the notion of model of a given program, we need to extend
the notion of interpretation to apply to literals and to conjunctions of literals:
Definition 3. Let I be an interpretation of a given program P . Then, I can be extended as follows:
• For every negative atom ∼ p appearing in P:
I (∼ p) =
Tk+1, if I (p) = FkFk+1, if I (p) = Tk0, if I (p) = 0.
• For every conjunction of literals l1, . . . , ln appearing as the body of a clause in P:
I (l1, . . . , ln) = min{I (l1), . . . , I (ln)}.
Notice that in the part of the definition concerning the conjunction of literals, we assume that when the conjunction is
empty, then the value is by default equal to T0.
The above definition provides a purely logical characterization of negation-as-failure; additionally, it clarifies the
difference between classical negation (which is simply reflection about 0) and negation-as-failure (which is reflection
about 0 followed by a step towards 0). The operational intuition behind the above definition is that the more times a
value is iterated through negation, the closer to zero it gets.
The notion of satisfiability of a clause can now be defined:
Definition 4. Let P be a program and I an interpretation. Then, I satisfies a clause p ← l1, . . . , ln of P if
I (p) ≥ I (l1, . . . , ln). Moreover, I is a model of P if I satisfies all clauses of P .
The following two definitions will be needed:
Definition 5. Let P be a program, I an interpretation of P , v ∈ V and n < ω. Then I ‖ v = {p ∈ BP | I (p) = v}
and I]n = {(p, v) ∈ I | order(v) = n}.
Definition 6. Let I and J be interpretations of a given program P and let k ∈ ω. We write I =k J , if for all n ≤ k,
I ‖ Tn = J ‖ Tn and I ‖ Fn = J ‖ Fn . We write I @k J , if for all n < k, I =n J and either I ‖ Tk ⊂ J ‖ Tk and
I ‖ Fk ⊇ J ‖ Fk , or I ‖ Tk ⊆ J ‖ Tk and I ‖ Fk ⊃ J ‖ Fk . We write I vk J if I =k J or I @k J .
The infinite-valued semantics of logic programs with negation is defined with the use of an appropriate operator:
Definition 7. Let P be a program and let I be an interpretation of P . The operator TP is defined as follows:
TP (I )(p) = max{I (l1, . . . , ln) | p← l1, . . . , ln ∈ P}
TP is called the immediate consequence operator for P .
The construction of the minimum model MP of a given program P can informally be described as follows. As a first
approximation to MP , we start with ∅, i.e., with the interpretation that assigns to every atom the value F0. We start
iterating TP on ∅ until both the set of atoms that have a F0 value and the set of atoms having a T0 value, stabilize. We
keep all these atoms whose values have stabilized and reset the values of all remaining atoms to the next false value
(namely F1). The procedure is repeated until the F1 and T1 values stabilize, and we reset the remaining atoms to a
value equal to F2, and so on. The atoms that will not get a value through this procedure, get the value 0 at the end.
The above process is illustrated by the following example:
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Example 8. Consider the program:
p←∼q
q ←∼r
s ← p
s ←∼s.
We start from the interpretation I = {(p, F0), (q, F0), (r, F0), (s, F0)}. Iterating TP twice, we get the interpretation
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T1)} in which the order 0 values have stabilized. We reset the values of all other
atoms to F1 getting the interpretation {(p, F1), (q, F1), (r, F0), (s, F1)}. We iterate TP two more times and we get
the interpretation {(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T2)} in which the order 1 values have converged. We reset all the
remaining values to F2 getting the interpretation {(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, F2)}. After two more iterations of
TP we get {(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, F4)} in which the order 2 values have stabilized. We reset s to F3 getting
{(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, F3)}. We iterate TP once getting {(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, T4)}. We see that there is
no value of order 3 in this interpretation. This means that s cannot get a value of order 3 (nor of any other finite order);
therefore, we can reset it to 0. Therefore, the final model is MP = {(p, F2), (q, T1), (r, F0), (s, 0)}.
We can now formalize the above notions:
Definition 9. Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and k ∈ ω. Moreover, assume that I vk TP (I ) vk
T 2P (I ) vk · · · vk T nP (I ) vk · · ·. Then, the sequence {T nP (I )}n<ω is called a k-chain.
Definition 10. Let P be a program, let I be an interpretation of P and assume that {T nP (I )}n<ω is a k-chain. Then, we
define the interpretation T ωP,k(I ) as follows:
T ωP,k(I )(p) =

I (p), if order(I (p)) < k
Tk, if p ∈⋃n<ω(T nP (I ) ‖ Tk)
Fk, if p ∈⋂n<ω(T nP (I ) ‖ Fk)
Fk+1, otherwise.
We now define a sequence of interpretations (that can be thought of as better and better approximations to the minimum
model of a given program P):
Definition 11. Let P be a program and let:
M0 = T ωP,0(∅)
Mk = T ωP,k(Mk−1) for k > 0.
Finally, define:
MP (p) =
{(⋃
k<ω(Mk]k)
)
(p), if this is defined
0, otherwise.
The M0,M1, . . . ,Mk, . . . are called the approximations of MP .
In [14] it is demonstrated that the Mk in the above definition are well-defined (one needs to demonstrate that there
is a k-chain involved when we use the T ωP,k operator). Moreover, in the same reference it is demonstrated that the
following theorems hold for MP :
Theorem 12. For every program P, the interpretation MP is its unique minimum infinite-valued model under an
ordering relation that is independent of the syntax of the program.
Theorem 13. Let P be a program and let NP be the interpretation that results from MP by collapsing all the Tk
values to True and all the Fk values to False. Then, NP is the well-founded model of P.
The first theorem establishes a syntax-independent characterization of the semantics of logic programs with negation.
The second theorem provides a direct connection of the infinite-valued model to the well-founded one. As an example,
the well-founded model of the program in Example 8 is equal to {(p, F), (q, T ), (r, F), (s, 0)}.
76 C. Galanaki et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 151 (2008) 70–88
4. Infinite-games of perfect information
The semantics that we develop in this paper is based on the so-called infinite-games of perfect information (or
PI-games for short) [7]. The games will take place between two players that we will call Player I and Player II. A
PI-game is one in which there is no hidden information: both players know all the moves that have been played so far,
and there are no simultaneous moves. The games are infinite in the sense that they do not terminate at a finite stage
and therefore in order to derive the outcome of a play it may be necessary to examine its entire history.
Before defining PI-games in a formal way, we need to introduce some notation. Sequences (finite or infinite in
length) will usually be denoted by s or x . A finite sequence of length k will be denoted by 〈s0, s1, . . . , sk−1〉 and the
empty sequence by 〈〉. Given k < ω and a sequence s of length at least k, s|k is the prefix of s of length k. Given
a non-empty set X , the set of all finite sequences of elements of X is denoted by Seq(X) and the set of all infinite
sequences of elements of X by Xω. A tree on X is a set R of finite sequences of members of X such that if u ∈ R and
v is a prefix of u, then v ∈ R.
A PI-game is based on a non-empty set X , called the set of moves that are available to the two players. Intuitively,
Player I initially chooses x0 ∈ X , then Player II chooses x1 ∈ X , and so on. As it usually happens with everyday
games, we would not like the moves made by the two players to be arbitrary. This means that we need a set of rules
that will impose restrictions on the moves of the two players. The rules are usually (see for example [9]) modeled by
a tree R on X : the game must proceed along some branch of R, otherwise the first player who gets outside R looses.
The rules of the game will usually be defined by putting down restrictions on the choice of xn that depend on the
preceding moves x0, . . . , xn−1. The tree R is then obtained in the obvious way:
〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉 is a path in R ⇔ for each i < n, xi is allowed by the restrictions.
Based on the set X , we define two sets A and B such that A is the set of strategies for Player I and B the set of
strategies for Player II. A strategy a ∈ A assigns a move to each even length partial play of the game; similarly for
b ∈ B an odd length partial plays. Additionally, we assume the existence of a set D, called the set of rewards, which
models the potential profit that a player will have after winning the game. Finally, we consider a function Φ, called
the payoff-function, which calculates the reward that the winner of a play of the game will get. Usually, the definition
of Φ depends on the set of rules R in the sense that if during a play one of the players first breaks the rules, then this
should be reflected by the value that Φ returns for that play. The above notions are formalized as follows:
Definition 14. An infinite-game of perfect information (or a PI-game for short) is a sextuple Γ = (X, R, A, B, D,Φ)
such that:
• X is a non-empty set, called the set of moves for Players I and II.
• R is a tree on X (usually implicitly specified by a set of rules) which imposes restrictions on the moves of the two
players.
• A is the set of strategies for Player I, which consists of all functions a :⋃n<ω X2n → X , with X0 = {〈〉}.• B is the set of strategies for Player II, which consists of all functions b :⋃n<ω X2n+1→ X .• D is a linearly ordered set called the set of rewards, with the property that for all S ⊆ D, lub(S) and glb(S) belong
to D.
• Φ : Xω → D is the payoff-function of the game.
Games of the above form will often be referred as games with payoff.
We now define the notion of a play of the game:
Definition 15. Let Γ = (X, R, A, B, D,Φ) be a game and let a ∈ A and b ∈ B be two strategies. We define the
following sequence:
s0 = a(〈〉)
s2i = a(〈s0, . . . , s2i−1〉)
s2i+1 = b(〈s0, . . . , s2i 〉).
A (complete) play of the game determined by the strategies a and b is the infinite sequence 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉. The si ’s
will be called the moves of the play. A prefix of a play is called a partial play.
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Given two strategies a ∈ A and b ∈ B, we will often write a ?b for the play determined by these two strategies. Given
a play s, we will say that a player first breaks the rules in s if the first move in s that does not conform to the rules of
the game is played by that particular player. A play s will be called legal if all its moves conform to the rules of the
game.
A special case of games which has a great deal of interest for descriptive set theory [9], is that of the so-called
win–lose games:
Definition 16. Let Γ = (X, R, A, B, {0, 1},Φ) be a game and let S ⊆ Xω be a set. Assume that the payoff-function
Φ of Γ is defined as follows:
Φ(s) =
{
1, (if Player II first breaks the rules R in s) or (s ∈ S)
0, otherwise.
Then, Γ will be called a win–lose game on S.
A special case of the above definition arises when R = Seq(X), i.e., when there are no restrictions on the moves of
the two players.
A notion that plays a very important role in the theory of infinite-games is that of determinacy (which is often used
in conjunction with the notion of the value of a game):
Definition 17. A game Γ = (X, R, A, B, D,Φ) is determined with value v if
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) = luba∈A glbb∈B Φ(a ? b) = v.
The following inequality (see for example [10]) holds for all games, determined or not:
Proposition 18. Let Γ = (X, R, A, B, D,Φ) be a game (determined or not). Then:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≥ luba∈A glbb∈B Φ(a ? b).
The notion of optimal strategies is closely connected to determinacy:
Definition 19. Let Γ = (X, R, A, B, D,Φ) be a game with value v. The set of optimal strategies for Player I
(respectively Player II), is denoted by OptIΓ (respectively Opt
I I
Γ ) and defined as:
OptIΓ = {a ∈ A | ∀b ∈ B, Φ(a ? b) ≥ v}
OptI IΓ = {b ∈ B | ∀a ∈ A, Φ(a ? b) ≤ v}.
We will often simply write OptI (respectively OptI I ) when the corresponding game is obvious from context.
Notice that it is possible for a game to be determined but no optimal strategies need exist (see for example [10]).
However, as we will later discuss, for the games we consider optimal strategies do exist.
The determinacy of win–lose games has been widely studied and many important results have been obtained. In
particular, if Γ is a win–lose game on a set S, then the properties of S play a very important role on the determinacy
of Γ . The following two definitions present the classes of open and Borel sets for which determinacy is guaranteed.
Definition 20. Let X be a non-empty set and let S ⊆ Xω. Then, S is called open if for all s ∈ Xω it is:
s ∈ S ⇒ ∃t ∈ ω(∀s′ ∈ Xω[(s|t = s′|t)⇒ s′ ∈ S]).
In other words, a set S is called open if for any s in S the fact that s is a member of S can be deduced from some finite
amount of knowledge about s. For example, take as X the set of natural numbers; then, the set of all sequences with
some occurrence of 0 is open, whereas the set of increasing sequences is not.
The finite Borel hierarchy is generated by closing out the class of open sets under the operations of union and
complementation (relative to Xω). More formally:
Definition 21. Let X be a non-empty set. Given S ⊆ Xω, let S denote the complement of S relative to Xω. Then, the
finite Borel hierarchy with respect to X is defined as follows:
• Σ 01 is the collection of all open sets of elements of Xω
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• For all n ≥ 1, Π 0n = {S | S ∈ Σ 0n }
• For all n ≥ 1, Σ 0n+1 = {
⋃
i∈ω Si | Si ∈ Π 0n }.
We then have the following important theorem due to Martin [8]:
Theorem 22 (Borel Determinacy Theorem). Let X be a non-empty countable set and let S ⊆ Xω. Let Γ be a win–
lose game on S. If S is Borel then Γ is determined.
Despite the fact that the games we will consider in this paper are not strictly win–lose, the above theorem will play an
important role in establishing their determinacy.
5. A formal definition of the negation game
In this section we give a precise definition of the game for logic programs with negation. Let P be a logic program
and G a goal clause. We define a PI-game ΓPG = (X, R, A, B, D,Φ), which we will often call a negation game, as
follows:
5.1. The set of moves
The set of moves X of ΓPG is equal to:
X = {G} ∪ P ∪ literals(PG) ∪ negvars(P).
In other words, a player can choose one of the following moves: (a) he can play the goal clause, or (b) play a clause
of the program, or (c) a literal that appears in G or in the body of a clause of P , or finally, (d) an atom that appears in
a negative literal in the body of some clause of p.
5.2. The rules of the game
We can now specify the rules that the two players must obey:
• (R1) The first move of Player I is the goal clause G.
• (R2) If the previous move is a clause, the next move is one of the literals in the body of the clause.
• (R3) If the previous move is a positive literal p, the next move is a clause in P whose head is p.
• (R4) If the previous rule is a negative literal ∼ p, the next move must be p itself (this last move is called a role-
switch).
Notice that if in rule (R2) the body of the clause is empty, then we will say that the player is forced to break rule
(R2). Similarly, the player is forced to break rule (R3) if he cannot find a clause in P whose head is p. If one of the
players breaks the rules without being forced to, we will say that he breaks the rules without reason. This last case
refers to moves that are completely unreasonable (such as for example if Player I does not play the goal clause as his
first move, or if a player does not choose a literal from the non-empty body of the clause that the other player has just
played, etc). We should note here that since our game is infinite, a play continues even after one of the two players
has broken the rules; however, the moves beyond this point will be irrelevant to the outcome of the play.
5.3. The sets of strategies
The sets of strategies for the game are specified as in Definition 14.
5.4. The set of rewards
The set D of rewards is the set {F, 0, T }. Intuitively, F corresponds to the False truth value, T to the True truth
value and 0 to an intermediate truth value that is above False and below True. From the game point of view, F
corresponds to a win of Player II, T to a win of Player I, and 0 to a tie between the two Players.
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5.5. The payoff-function
Let a ∈ A and b ∈ B be two strategies, and let s = a ?b be the unique play determined by a and b. Before defining
the payoff-function, we need to specify when a play can be characterized as a win for Player I (respectively, Player
II), i.e., when it is a true-play (respectively, false-play). The conditions used by the two following definitions, will be
explained just after the definitions.
Definition 23. Let P be a program, G a goal, and let s be a play of the corresponding game ΓPG . Then, s is called
a true-play if either Player II first breaks the rules in s or if s is a legal play that contains an odd number of negative
literals.
Definition 24. Let P be a program, G a goal, and s a play of the corresponding game ΓPG . Then, s is called a
false-play if either Player I first breaks the rules in s or if s is a legal play that contains an even number of negative
literals.
Intuitively, a true-play (respectively, false-play) is a play that is won by Player I (respectively, Player II). More
specifically, a play s can be characterized as a true-play (respectively, false-play) if Player II (respectively, Player
I) first breaks the rules in s. On the other hand, if s is legal (i.e., it has no rule violations) and it contains a finite
number of role-switches, then one of the two players remains a doubter after the last role-switch; we would like this
particular player to be the winner of the play. So, we keep track of which player remains the doubter, by counting
the number of negative literals (or role-switches) in the play. In the beginning of the play, it is Player II who is the
doubter, and therefore an even number of role-switches means that Player I will be the doubter after the role-switches
end. Similarly, when an even number of role-switches takes place, it will be Player I who will remain a doubter at the
end.
We are now in a position to give a formal definition of the payoff-function Φ:
Φ(s) =
T, if s is a true-playF, if s is a false-play0, otherwise.
Notice that in the above definition of the payoff-function, the value 0 corresponds to the case where there is an infinite
number of role-switches in the play.
5.6. Certain examples
We now illustrate the above definitions with certain examples:
Example 25. Consider the program P:
p←∼q, r
q ←∼s
r ← r
s ←
and the goal G =← p. Consider a play of the following form:
Player I Player II
← p p
p←∼q, r ∼q
q q ←∼s
∼s s
s ← · · ·
· · · · · ·
In a play of this form, it is Player II who first breaks the rules, and therefore it is a true-play. Therefore, the payoff is
equal to T . Another play of this game is the following:
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Player I Player II
← p p
p←∼q, r r
r ← r r
· · · · · ·
This is obviously a legal play (i.e., no player ever breaks the rules) and it is a false-play since it contains an even
number of negative literals (zero). Consequently, the payoff in this case is equal to F .
Example 26. Consider the program P:
p ← ∼ p
and the goal G =← p. Then, there is a unique legal play of the game, namely:
Player I Player II
← p p
p←∼ p ∼ p
p p←∼ p
∼ p p
...
...
It is easy to see that this play is neither a true-play nor a false-play and therefore the payoff in this case is equal to 0.
6. Determinacy of the negation game
In this section we demonstrate that given a program P and a goal← p, the game ΓP∪{←p} is determined, i.e., it
has a value. In other words, there exists a value (either F , 0 or T ) that is associated with this game (and therefore with
p). Since for every atom of P there exists a corresponding game that has a value, this implies that to every atom of the
program there corresponds a distinguished value. All these atom–value pairs constitute a three-valued interpretation
of P which as we will demonstrate is actually a model of P (and which as we are going to see later on coincides with
the well-founded model of P).
A basic difference between the negation game and the games that are customarily used in descriptive set theory
is that the former is a three-valued one (and not just win–lose), and therefore it is not immediately obvious that it
is determined. However, as we are going to demonstrate, we can adapt the powerful results that hold for win–lose
games in order to apply to our case. The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for a three-valued game
to be determined. Notice that the result holds for any three-valued game that satisfies the requirements of the lemma
(and not just for the negation game). This result (which we have not seen explicitly stated elsewhere) was inspired by
Corollary 3.3 of [10] that applies to games that have real-valued payoff-functions.
Lemma 27. Let Γ = (X, R, A, B, {F, 0, T },Φ) be a negation game. Assume that Φ has the property that for every
v ∈ {F, 0, T } the set S(v) = {s ∈ Xω | Φ(s) ≥ v} is Borel. Then, Γ is determined.
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is to use the Borel determinacy result for win–lose games in order to derive the
determinacy of this more complicated game. More specifically, for every v ∈ {F, 0, T }, we define the win–lose game
Γv = (X, R′, A, B, {0, 1},Φv) on the set S(v), where R′ = Seq(X) (i.e., there are no restrictions for the players of
the game). By the Borel Determinacy Theorem, every Γv is determined. Let v∗ = max{v ∈ {F, 0, T } | OptIΓv 6= ∅}
i.e., v∗ is the maximum of all v such that the corresponding win–lose game Γv is a win for Player I. Notice that v∗ is
well-defined because there exists at least one of the Γv’s that is a win for Player I: the game ΓF (for which S(F) = Xω
and therefore Player I wins in every case). We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: v∗ = T . Then, by the definition of v∗, OptIΓv∗ is not empty. Choose a0 ∈ OptIΓv∗ . Then, for any b ∈ B, we
have that a0 ? b ∈ S(v∗), since a0 is a winning strategy for Player I in game Γv∗ . But then, by the definition of S(v∗),
we have that Φ(a0 ? b) ≥ v∗. Therefore, we have:
luba∈A glbb∈B Φ(a ? b) ≥ glbb∈B Φ(a0 ? b) ≥ v∗ = T .
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The above together with Proposition 18 immediately imply that in this case the game ΓPG is determined with value
v∗ = T .
Case 2: v∗ = 0. Using exactly the same reasoning as in Case 1 we get that:
luba∈A glbb∈B Φ(a ? b) ≥ 0.
Take now v = T . Then, OptI IΓv is not empty because v∗ = max{v ∈ {F, 0, T } | OptIΓv 6= ∅} and because the game Γv
is determined. Then, there exists b0 ∈ OptI IΓv such that for any a ∈ A, a ? b0 6∈ S(v). By the definition of S(v), we
have that Φ(a ? b0) < v = T . Therefore:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≤ luba∈A Φ(a ? b0) < T .
Using the above two facts together with Proposition 18, we get that in this case the game ΓPG is determined with value
v∗ = 0.
Case 3: v∗ = F . Take v = 0. As in Case 2, we get that there exists b0 ∈ OptI IΓv such that for any a ∈ A, Φ(a ?b0) < v.
This gives:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≤ luba∈A Φ(a ? b0) < v = 0.
This immediately implies that:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) = F.
Using this fact together with Proposition 18, we get that in this case the game ΓPG is determined with value v
∗ = F .
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
The above proposition suggests that in order to demonstrate that the negation game is determined, it suffices to
establish that the sets S(F), S(0) and S(T ) are Borel. The definition and the two propositions that follow (see for
example [9] for the corresponding proofs) provide a convenient tool for establishing that a given set is Borel:
Definition 28. Let X be a non-empty set and let G ⊆ Xω × ωk , k ∈ ω. Then, G will be called open if for all s ∈ Xω
and for all n1, . . . , nk ∈ ω it is:
(s, n1, . . . , nk) ∈ G ⇒ ∃t ∈ ω(∀s′ ∈ Xω[(s|t = s′|t)⇒ (s′, n1, . . . , nk) ∈ G]).
The complement of an open set is a closed set.
Proposition 29. Let X be a set and S be a subset of Xω. Then, if n is odd, S is Σ 0n if and only if there exists an open
set G ⊆ Xω × ωn−1, such that:
s ∈ S ⇔ ∃t1∀t2∃t3 · · · ∀tn−1G(s, t1, . . . , tn−1).
Similarly, if n is even, then S is Σ 0n if and only if there is a closed F such that
s ∈ S ⇔ ∃t1∀t2∃t3 · · · ∃tn−1F(s, t1, . . . , tn−1).
Proposition 30. Let X be a set and S be a subset of Xω. Then, if n is odd, S is Π 0n if and only if there exists a closed
set F ⊆ Xω × ωn−1, such that:
s ∈ S ⇔ ∀t1∃t2∀t3 · · · ∃tn−1F(s, t1, . . . , tn−1).
Similarly, if n is even, then S is Π 0n if and only if there is an open set G such that
s ∈ S ⇔ ∀t1∃t2∀t3 · · · ∀tn−1G(s, t1, . . . , tn−1).
Since an open (respectively closed) set defines a relation in the obvious way, we will often use the term open
relation (respectively closed relation).
It therefore now remains to show that the sets S(F), S(0) and S(T ) of Lemma 27 are Borel. This is demonstrated
by the following lemma:
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Lemma 31. The sets S(F), S(0) and S(T ) are Borel.
Proof. The set S(F) = {s ∈ Xω | Φ(s) ≥ F} is trivially Borel since it coincides with Xω. Consider now the case
S(T ) = {s ∈ Xω | Φ(s) = T }. Recall now (Definition 23) that Φ(s) = T iff s is a true-play, i.e., iff either Player II
first breaks the rules in s or s is a legal sequence that contains an odd number of negative literals. It suffices to express
this condition in the notation of one of the above propositions. We express S(T ) as:
S(T ) = {s | ∀t1∃t2∀t3∃t4∀t5G(s, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5)}.
The relation G is defined as:
G(s, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) = G1(s, t1, t2, t3) ∨ G2(s, t4)
where G1 expresses the condition “is a legal sequence that contains an odd number of negative literals” and G2 the
condition “Player II first breaks the rules”. Notice that in the definition of G, t5 is vacuously quantified (it does not
appear in the right-hand side of the definition). The definitions of G1 and G2 have as follows:
G1(s, t1, t2, t3) = [(〈s0, . . . , st1〉 is a legal partial play)∧ (〈s0, . . . , st2〉 has an odd number of negative literals)∧ ((t3 > t2)⇒ (st3 is not a negative literal))]
and:
G2(s, t4) = [(〈s0, . . . , s2t4〉 is a legal partial play)∧ (〈s0, . . . , s2t4+1〉 is not a legal partial play)].
It is easy to see that G is open: take t = max{t1 − 1, t2 − 1, t3, 2t4 + 1} in the definition of open set (Definition 28).
The case for S(0) is similar: it suffices to express the condition “s is a legal play that has an infinite number of
negative literals or s is a true-play”. We omit the details. 
We therefore have the following corollary that results directly from the two lemmas of this section:
Corollary 32. Let P be a program, G a goal clause and let ΓPG be the corresponding game. Then, ΓPG is determined.
Since the negation game is determined, we have the following definition:
Definition 33. Let P be a program. We define the game interpretation NP of P as the interpretation such that for
every p ∈ BP , NP (p) is equal to the value of the game ΓP∪{←p}.
The following theorem states that the game interpretation of a program is actually a model of the program:
Theorem 34. Let P be a program. Then, NP is a model of P.
Proof. Assume that NP is not a model of P . Then, there must exist a clause p ← l1, . . . , ln such that NP (p) <
NP (l1, . . . , ln), i.e., NP (p) < NP (li ), for all i ≤ n. Consider now a strategy a for Player I which chooses as his
second move the above clause. Now, if Player II chooses a positive literal li from this clause, then the strategy a
proceeds in the same way as an optimal strategy of Player I for the game ΓP∪{←li }. If on the other hand Player II
chooses a negative literal li =∼ qi , then the strategy a proceeds according to an optimal strategy of Player II for
the game ΓP∪{←qi }. Now, since NP (p) < NP (li ) for all i ≤ n, the strategy a when played against any strategy b
of Player II, gives a payoff which is greater than NP (p). Therefore, the value of the game ΓP∪{←p} is greater than
NP (p) (contradiction). Consequently, NP is a model of P . 
The above theorem provides a novel, purely game-theoretic characterization of the semantics of negation in logic
programming. In the next sections we investigate how this approach relates to the existing semantic approaches for
negation.
C. Galanaki et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 151 (2008) 70–88 83
7. The refined negation game
In the next section we will demonstrate the equivalence of the game semantics to the well-founded model of
negation in logic programming. As we have already mentioned, the well-founded model is usually constructed in
stages. For this reason, in this paper we have adopted the infinite-valued characterization of the well-founded model
which makes these stages more explicit. On the other hand, the three-valued negation game that we have defined does
not have any notion of “stages”. This difference between the well-founded model (or the infinite-valued model) and
the three-valued game makes it difficult at first sight to establish their equivalence. The solution we have adopted is to
refine the negation game getting a new game in which the two players can have degrees of winning and losing. These
degrees correspond to the stages of the well-founded model (and correspondingly to the different levels of truth values
of the infinite-valued model). The existence of “stages” in our formalisms allows us to prove results by induction.
Therefore, in this section we will define the refined negation game and we will demonstrate that it is determined.
The basic idea behind the refined game is that the payoff of a given play will depend on the number of role-switches
that have taken place. More specifically, assume that we have a legal play or a play in which the rules are first broken
because one of the players is forced to break them. Then, if the play is a true-play (respectively false-play), the payoff
is going to be Tk (respectively Fk), where k is the number of role-switches that have taken place. If on the other hand
we have a play in which the rules are first broken without reason by Player I (respectively Player II) then the other
player gets the maximum possible payoff, namely F0 (respectively T0).
More formally now, we define sˆ to be the maximum initial segment of s in which the rules have not been broken; in
particular, sˆ = s if s is a legal play. Moreover, we define ‖ s ‖ as follows: if s is not a legal play and the first violation
of the rules in s is without reason, then ‖ s ‖= 0; otherwise, ‖ s ‖ is equal to the number of negative literals in sˆ.
We can now give the formal definition of the refined game. We need to refine the definition of the set of rewards
and of the payoff-function, as follows:
The set of rewards: The set D of rewards is the set {F0, F1, . . . , 0, . . . , T1, T0} of truth values which are ordered as:
F0 < F1 < · · · < 0 < · · · < T1 < T0.
The payoff-function: The refined payoff-function Φ is defined as follows:
Φ(s) =
T‖s‖, if s is a true-playF‖s‖, if s is a false-play0, otherwise.
We now argue about the determinacy of this refined game. The proof is similar in spirit but more complicated than
that of Lemma 27:
Lemma 35. Let Γ = (X, R, A, B, V,Φ) be a refined negation game. Assume now that Φ has the property that for
every v ∈ V the set S(v) = {s ∈ Xω | Φ(s) ≥ v} is Borel. Then, Γ is determined.
Proof. The basic idea is to use the Borel determinacy of simple win–lose games in order to establish the determinacy
of the refined game. More specifically, for every v ∈ V , we define the win–lose game Γv = (X, R′, A, B, {0, 1},Φv)
on the set S(v), where R′ = Seq(X). By the Borel Determinacy Theorem, every Γv is determined. Let v∗ = lub{v ∈
V | OptIΓv 6= ∅} i.e., v∗ is the least upper bound of all v such that the corresponding win–lose game Γv is a win for
Player I. Notice that v∗ is well-defined because there exists at least one of the Γv’s that is a win for Player I: the game
ΓF0 (for which S(F0) = Xω and therefore Player I wins in every case).
Case 1: v∗ = Fk , k ≥ 0. By the definition of v∗, OptIΓv∗ is not empty. Choose a0 ∈ OptIΓv∗ . Then, for any b ∈ B, we
have that a0 ? b ∈ S(v∗), since a0 is a winning strategy for Player I in game Γv∗ . But then, by the definition of S(v∗),
we have that Φ(a0 ? b) ≥ v∗. Therefore:
luba∈A glbb∈B Φ(a ? b) ≥ glbb∈B Φ(a0 ? b) ≥ v∗ = Fk .
Let now v = Fk+1. Then, OptI IΓv is not empty because v∗ = lub{v ∈ V | OptIΓv 6= ∅} and because the game Γv is
determined. Then, there exists b0 ∈ OptI IΓv such that for any a ∈ A, a ? b0 6∈ S(v). By the definition of S(v), we have
that Φ(a ? b0) < v. Therefore:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≤ luba∈A Φ(a ? b0) < v = Fk+1.
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Combining the two inequalities that we have obtained together with Proposition 18, we get the desired result for the
case v∗ = Fk .
Case 2: v∗ = 0. Then, exactly as in Case 1, it can be shown that:
luba∈A glbb∈B Φ(a ? b) ≥ v∗.
Consider now on the other hand any v such that v > v∗. Then, OptI IΓv is not empty because v
∗ = lub{v ∈ V | OptIΓv 6=
∅} and because the game Γv is determined. Then, there exists b0 ∈ OptI IΓv such that for any a ∈ A, a ? b0 6∈ S(v). By
the definition of S(v), we have that Φ(a ? b0) < v. Therefore:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≤ luba∈A Φ(a ? b0) < v.
Now, since the above holds for all v > v∗, we get:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≤ v∗.
Combining the two inequalities that we have obtained together with Proposition 18, we get the desired result for the
case v∗ = 0.
Case 3: v∗ = Tk , k ≥ 0. For the case v∗ = T0, it is immediately obvious that:
glbb∈B luba∈A Φ(a ? b) ≤ v∗.
For the case v∗ = Tk , k > 0, take v = Tk−1. The proof then follows in the same way as in Case 1. 
It now remains to demonstrate that each of the sets S(v) of the above proposition, is Borel:
Lemma 36. The sets S(v), v ∈ V , are Borel.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 31. 
We therefore have the following corollary that follows directly from the two lemmas of this section:
Corollary 37. Let P be a program, G a goal clause and let ΓPG be the corresponding refined negation game. Then,
ΓPG is determined.
8. Equivalence of the game to the well-founded model
Consider a given logic program P . What we would like to demonstrate is that the value that the infinite-
valued model assigns to an atom p, coincides with the value of the game ΓP∪{←p}. This can be demonstrated by
simultaneously showing (by induction on k) the following two statements:
• If the value of the game ΓP∪{←p} is Tk (or Fk), then the value assigned to p by the minimum infinite-valued model
is Tk (respectively Fk).
• If the value assigned to p by the minimum infinite-valued model is Tk (or Fk) then the value of the game ΓP∪{←p}
is Tk (respectively Fk).
The first of the above two statements is easier to establish: we define a quantity called the depth of the game and then
show the desired statement by an inner induction on the depth (actually, the depth is only needed for the Tk case).
The second statement is trickier to demonstrate. We give an intuitive description of the approach we use. Assume
that the minimum infinite-valued model assigns to p the value Tk (similar arguments apply for Fk). Then, we must
show that there exists a strategy for Player I such that for all the strategies of Player II, the payoff is greater than or
equal to Tk . In other words, the desired strategy for Player I must not be arbitrary: it must make careful selections in
order to corner Player II to a value greater than or equal to Tk . Now, since the value that the model assigns to p is
equal to Tk , there must exist a clause in P whose body evaluates (under the infinite-valued model) to Tk . This is a
good choice for Player I because no matter which literal Player II will choose from the body of the clause, Player I
can ensure a payoff of at least Tk . But then, using the induction hypothesis and the determinacy of the refined game, it
can be shown that the best possible situation for the two players occurs when the payoff is exactly Tk . This intuitively
establishes the desired result.
We can now proceed with the formal details of the proof. We start with the following simple lemma:
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Lemma 38. Let ΓPG be a refined negation game with value v 6= 0. Then, the two players have optimal strategies (i.e.,
the sets OptI and OptI I are non-empty).
Proof. Since the value of the game is either Tk or Fk for some k ∈ ω, and since there are no arbitrarily close
approximations to Tk and Fk other than themselves, the result follows immediately. 
We now define a quantity that will be used in the definition of depth:
Definition 39. Let ΓPG = (X, R, A, B, V,Φ) be a refined negation game with value v > 0 and let s be the play
determined by two strategies a ∈ OptIΓPG and b ∈ Opt
I I
ΓPG
. Then, by  s  we denote the number of moves that
Player II has played in s before either a fact or a negative literal is encountered.
We can now define the “depth” of a given game. Assume that we consider a game ΓPG that has value v > 0. Then, by
Lemma 38, the sets OptIΓPG
and OptI IΓPG
of optimal strategies of the game are non-empty. We have:
Definition 40. Let ΓPG = (X, R, A, B, V,Φ) be a refined negation game with value v > 0. Define:
d = mina∈OptI maxb∈OptI I a ? b .
The quantity d is called the depth of the game ΓPG .
Intuitively, the depth expresses the maximum number of moves that Player II can play before a negative literal or a
fact is encountered, in the case that Player I plays in the best possible way. It is not hard to see that the notion of
depth is well-defined, i.e., it is always finite. If Player II could (against any strategy of Player I) make the game last
arbitrarily long before a negative literal or a fact is encountered, then (by Ko¨nig’s Lemma) he would be able to make
it last for ever. But in this case the value of the game would be F0, which contradicts our assumption in Definition 40
that the value of the game is greater than 0.
We can now establish the equivalence of the refined game with the infinite-valued semantics:
Theorem 41. Let P be a program and let p be an atom that appears in P. Consider the goal G =← p and let
ΓPG = (X, R, A, B, V,Φ) be the corresponding refined game. Moreover, let MP be the minimum infinite-valued
model of P. Then, ΓPG has value Tk (respectively Fk) if and only if MP (p) = Tk (respectively MP (p) = Fk).
Proof. The proof is by induction on k.
Basis Case:We demonstrate the case k = 0.
(⇒) Assume that the game has value T0 (the proof for F0 is actually easier since it does not use the notion of depth,
and therefore omitted). We demonstrate the desired result by induction on the depth of the game. In particular we
show that for all p in P , if ΓP∪{←p} has value T0 and depth d, then MP (p) = T0. The basis case is for d = 1. This
can only happen if Player I plays a fact p← as his second move (his first move is the goal clause), in which case the
desired result is immediate. Assume that the result holds for depths ≤ d. We demonstrate the case d + 1. Consider
strategies a ∈ OptI and b ∈ OptI I such thata ? b= d + 1. Let p← l1, . . . , lr be the second move of Player I, in
the play a ? b. Now, since a ∈ Opt I , every play determined by a and any strategy of Player II, always has payoff T0.
But then this easily implies that all the li are positive literals and that the games ΓP∪{←li } have value T0; moreover,
their depth is at most d. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, MP (li ) = T0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r , which implies that
MP (p) = T0 (since MP is a model of P).
(⇐) MP (p) = T0 (the case MP (p) = F0 is similar and omitted). We demonstrate the following statement using
induction: for all p in P and for all m ∈ ω, if TmP (∅)(p) = T0, then ΓP∪{←p} has value T0. The basis case is for
m = 0 and it vacuously holds. Assume that the statement holds for m. We demonstrate the case m + 1, i.e., we show
that for all p in P , if Tm+1P (∅)(p) = T0, then ΓP∪{←p} has value T0. Obviously, there must exist in P either a fact
of the form p ← or a clause p ← l1, . . . , lr such that TmP (∅)(l1, . . . , lr ) = T0. In the latter case, all the li must be
positive literals and TmP (∅)(li ) = T0 for all i . By the induction hypothesis, the games ΓP∪{←li } all have value T0.
Consider now a strategy a ∈ A which proceeds as follows: if there exists a fact p← in P , then a specifies this fact as
the first move of Player I; otherwise, it specifies a clause p← l1, . . . , lr as discussed above. Moreover, the subsequent
moves of Player I dictated by a ensure a payoff T0 (we know this is possible because, by the induction hypothesis, the
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games ΓP∪{←li } all have value T0). Therefore, the strategy a gives a payoff T0 against all strategies of Player II; this
implies that the game ΓP∪{←p} has value T0.
This concludes the proof of⇐ and of the basis case.
Induction Hypothesis:We assume that the statement holds for all natural numbers less than or equal to k.
Induction Step:We demonstrate the desired result for k + 1.
(⇒) We show that if ΓPG has value Tk+1 then MP (p) = Tk+1 (the case Fk+1 is similar and omitted). We demonstrate
by an inner induction on the depth of the game that for all p in P , if ΓP∪{←p} has value Tk+1 and depth d, then
MP (p) = Tk+1. The basis case is for d = 1. The fact that d = 1 implies that there exists an optimal strategy of
Player I that chooses as the second move of Player I the clause p ← E such that all literals in E that can be chosen
by optimal strategies of Player II, are negative. Let ∼q be one of these literals. Then, by applying the outer induction
hypothesis to the game ΓP∪{←q}, one can easily see that MP (q) = Fk and therefore MP (∼ q) = Tk+1. For every
other literal l that appears in E it can easily be shown that MP (l) ≥ Tk+1. Therefore, MP (p) ≥ Tk+1 (since MP is a
model of P), which (by the outer induction hypothesis) means that MP (p) = Tk+1.
Assume now that the result holds for all depths less than or equal to d. We demonstrate the case d + 1. Consider
strategies a ∈ OptI and b ∈ OptI I such that a ? b = d + 1. Let p ← l1, . . . , lr be the second move of Player
I under the strategy a and let p1, . . . , pr be the atoms that correspond to the literals l1, . . . , lr . Then, it is easy to see
that for every one of the li one of the following holds:
• li = pi and the game ΓP∪{←pi } has value Tk+1 and depth at most d, or
• li = pi and the game ΓP∪{←pi } has value ≥ Tk , or
• li =∼ pi and the game ΓP∪{←pi } has value ≤ Fk .
In all the above cases, using either the inner or the outer induction hypothesis, it is MP (li ) ≥ Tk+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r .
This implies that MP (p) ≥ Tk+1 (since MP is a model of P), which (by the outer induction hypothesis) means that
MP (p) = Tk+1.
(⇐) Assume that MP (p) = Tk+1 (a similar proof applies in the case where MP (p) = Fk+1). Then, there exists m
such that TmP (Mk)(p) = Tk+1. We perform an inner induction on m, i.e., we demonstrate that if TmP (Mk)(p) = Tk+1
then ΓPG has value Tk+1. The case m = 0 vacuously holds because Mk does not assign the value Tk+1 to any atom.
Assume that the statement holds for m. We demonstrate the case m+1. Assume therefore that Tm+1P (Mk)(p) = Tk+1.
This implies that there exists a clause p← E in P such that TmP (Mk)(E) = Tk+1. Assume now that Player I chooses
as his second move a clause p ← E of the above form. Then, no matter how Player II plays, Player I can ensure a
payoff of at least Tk+1:
• If Player II chooses a positive literal l such that TmP (Mk)(l) ≥ Tk+1, then the game ΓP∪{←l} has (by the outer
induction hypothesis or the inner induction hypothesis) value MP (l) = TmP (Mk)(l) ≥ Tk+1.• If Player II chooses a negative literal ∼ r , and TmP (Mk)(∼ r) ≥ Tk+1, then the game ΓP∪{←r} has (again by the
outer induction hypothesis) value MP (r) = TmP (Mk)(r) ≤ Fk .
The above discussion suggests that Player I has a winning strategy that ensures a payoff of at least Tk+1. Now, since
the game is determined (Corollary 37) and the values above Tk+1 are (by the outer induction hypothesis) reserved
for the atoms of P that under MP have value greater than Tk+1, we get that the value of ΓPG is exactly Tk+1. This
concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Notice that the above theorem does not state anything about the case where either the game or the minimum infinite-
valued model assigns to an atom the value 0. But since the refined game is determined and since the game and the
infinite-valued model agree on all other cases, the following result is immediate:
Theorem 42. Let P be a program and let p be an atom that appears in P. Consider the goal G =← p and let
ΓPG = (X, R, A, B, V,Φ) be the corresponding refined game. Moreover, let MP be the minimum infinite-valued
model of P. Then, ΓPG has value v ∈ V if and only if MP (p) = v.
Therefore, the refined game is equivalent to the minimum infinite-valued model. Now, since the refined game collapses
to the unrefined one and the infinite-valued model collapses to the well-founded one, we have:
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Theorem 43. Let P be a program and let p be an atom that appears in P. Consider the goal G =← p and let
ΓPG = (X, R, A, B, {F, 0, T },Φ) be the corresponding (unrefined) game. Moreover, let M be the well-founded
model of P. Then, ΓPG has value v ∈ {F, 0, T } if and only if M(p) = v.
This concludes the proof of the equivalence between the well-founded semantics and the simple unrefined negation
game that we have introduced.
9. Related and future work
We have presented a game semantics for well-founded negation in logic programming. Despite the fact that
game semantics are well-established for more mainstream programming languages [2], their application to logic
programming has been very restricted. To our knowledge, there exist only two other works that deal with the problem
of giving a game semantics to logic programming. However, both of them deal with the negation-free case which
is actually simpler. The first of them, appears in [16] in which M.H. van Emden develops a probabilistic version
of logic programming whose proof theory is described using a two-person game. This work, although ground-
breaking, does not treat negation apart from a short discussion in the concluding section regarding Clark’s negation-
as-failure (at the time that [16] was published, well-founded negation had not yet been formalized). More recently,
the game for the negation-free case was also studied in [4], and interesting connections with the classical semantics
of logic programming have been established; however, well-founded negation is still not considered (apart from a
short paragraph in the concluding section regarding the possibility of extending the game to programs with negative
goals). Less directly connected to our work but very indicative of the rich connections between game theory and
logic programming, is the work of M. De Vos (see for example [18], [19], etc). More specifically, in [19] certain new
logic programming formalisms are introduced in order to model decision-making. It is demonstrated that strategic
games and extensive games of perfect information can be represented in these new formalisms in such a way that the
equilibria of the games can be retrieved as the stable models or answer-sets of the programs.
There are many aspects of this work that we feel should be further investigated. First of all, we believe that the
(unrefined) negation game applies as it is to infinite propositional programs. However, the proof of correctness has
to be more involved. This is mainly due to the fact that the construction of the well-founded model of an infinite
propositional program may require a transfinite number of iterations. This is also reflected in the construction of the
minimum infinite-valued model of such programs: in this case the set V of truth values contains an Fα and an Tα for
each countable ordinal α (see [14] for details). Therefore, in the correctness proof for the case of infinite programs,
one has to appropriately redefine the refined game so as that the payoff-function ranges over this new extended set of
truth values. In the theory of infinite-games such a situation is usually treated by introducing an auxiliary ordinal in
the game that can be considered as a type of clock which imposes a “time limit” to the moves of the players (see for
example [20][page 47]). We are currently investigating this issue.
The use of any new semantic approach for a programming language, can only be tested by its applications. We
are therefore interested in applying the proposed approach in order to establish properties of logic programs that use
well-founded negation. We conjecture that the game semantics can be used to demonstrate the correctness of program
transformations as well as to define new ones. Since games are intuitive and natural, it is interesting to investigate
whether they can offer certain benefits when compared against the classical semantics approaches. Moreover, we
would like to extend the game semantics to apply to other logic programming languages. One possible such candidate
is disjunctive logic programming (with or without negation in clause bodies).
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